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1. Introduction 
Social preferences, sometimes referred to as other-regarding preferences, are important in many 
areas of decision making. They matter in charitable giving (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; List, 
2011), bilateral or small-group bargaining (Kugler et al., 2007), social choice (Engelmann and 
Strobel, 2004), the private provision of public goods (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010), or in 
exchange situations without contractual enforcement (Fehr et al., 1993; Charness and 
Dufwenberg, 2006). As a consequence, they shape the design of behaviorally optimal 
institutions and contracts (Fehr et al., 2007). Numerous models have been developed in 
economics that all capture important forms of social preferences (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Levine, 
1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Kerschbamer, 2015). Given 
the ubiquitous importance of social preferences, research in economics on the origins and the 
development of social preferences over the life-cycle has gained ground in recent years, as 
Section 2 will show. 
In this paper, we present an experiment with 883 children and adolescents, aged eight 
to 17 years. Using eight simple, one-shot allocation tasks (taken from Engelmann and Strobel, 
2004), we study the distribution of effective social preferences across age and gender. 
According to the choices made in the incentivized allocation decisions, we can classify our 
experimental subjects according to five different motivations in terms of social preferences that 
have captured large interest in the literature1: selfishness, efficiency (maximizing the sum of 
payoffs in a reference group), maximin (maximizing the minimum payoff in a reference group), 
and two forms of inequality aversion (minimizing the difference in payoffs in a reference 
group). The classification is done by conducting a maximum likelihood error-rate analysis of 
subjects’ decisions (following, in general, the econometric model used in Costa-Gomes et al., 
2001). The mixture model used here assumes that each subject’s motivation is drawn from a 
common prior distribution over the five types of motivations and that a subject’s primary 
motivation is the same for all eight decisions, but that decision makers are allowed to make 
errors. One innovation of the paper, compared to related papers, is our ability to estimate also 
the secondary motivation of a particular subject. This secondary motivation becomes crucial 
                                                 
1 Note that we are focusing here on outcome-based social preferences. Hence, we will disregard other aspects, like 
reciprocity, guilt, or intentions. 
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for decisions when the primary motivation implies indifference between various available 
choices. By estimating both a primary and a secondary motivation, we believe that we are able 
to address the interplay between different motivations in a more detailed way than has been 
done so far. 
The results from our experiment show that the distribution of primary motivations is 
strongly influenced by age and gender. For older boys (aged ten to 17), efficiency concerns 
become significantly more relevant, while inequality aversion loses importance. In contrast, 
older girls care much more about the minimum payoff in their reference groups (maximin-
motivation). Comparing boys and girls, we find that efficiency concerns are significantly more 
important for boys than for girls from the age of ten years onwards, while a significantly higher 
proportion of girls are maximin-motivated in all age groups considered in our experiment. Girls 
are also significantly more inequality averse than boys when they are twelve years or older. Of 
course, our estimations reveal considerable heterogeneity of motivations in all age groups. It is 
interesting to note that, on average, the results for our oldest group of participants match the 
data of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) for adults reasonably well. 
Also examining secondary motivations enables us to get a broader picture of the social 
preferences and the gender differences. Most girls’ primary motivation is maximin, but for 
those who hold another primary motivation, the modal secondary motivations are maximin 
choices. This finding confirms the importance of this social preference for girls. Moreover,  
many boys  are primarily efficiency-motivated, and for those  who had another primary 
motivation, efficiency is the most common secondary motivation, confirming that boys indeed 
care most for efficiency. In sum, our estimation of secondary motivations corroborates our 
finding that girls and boys differ strongly in their social preferences, including both primary 
and secondary motivations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we refer to related literature 
and put our contribution into perspective. Section 3 discusses some theoretical background and 
explains our experimental design. In Section 4 we present the experimental results, first on an 
aggregate level and then on the basis of a mixture model that allows estimating the distribution 
of motivations with regard to social preferences across age groups and gender. Section 5 
discusses our findings and concludes the paper. 
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2. Related literature and our contribution 
The development of social preferences early on in life has captured growing interest in 
economics and other disciplines in recent years. Studying potential changes of social 
preferences when children and teenagers grow up is interesting from a developmental 
perspective as it reveals insights on whether humans go through different phases in the 
development of their social behavior or whether social preferences can be considered as rather 
stable from early on in life (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 2008; Gummerum et al., 2010). Moreover, 
studying the development and evolution of social preferences in children and teenagers may be 
helpful for ultimately identifying their sources such as social norms, family backgrounds, or 
cultural influences (Deckers et al., 2015).  
Fehr et al. (2008) present a study with 229 children aged three to eight years, in which 
children have to allocate rewards between themselves and one other child. They show that 
egalitarianism, i.e., inequality aversion develops strongly in the period of life that they capture. 
Children at the age of three and four behave selfishly to a very large degree, whereas the 
majority of children aged seven or eight prefer egalitarian allocations that avoid both 
advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. More precisely, about 60% of seven- to eight-
year old children can be classified as having egalitarian preferences, while the corresponding 
share for three- to four-year olds is only 20%. Fehr et al. (2013) extend the study of Fehr et al. 
(2008) by letting 717 nine- to 17-year old children and adolescents make two-person allocation 
choices. Their major findings are that spite and inequality aversion become less important with 
increasing age, while efficiency seeking becomes more prevalent with increasing age. 
Gummerum et al. (2010) find in a dictator game with 77 children aged three to five 
years that older children share more than younger children, and they show that girls are more 
generous than boys. Benenson et al. (2007) use a dictator game with 360 children aged four to 
nine years and find that older children and those from families with a higher socio-economic 
status behave more altruistically, i.e., prefer more egalitarian choices over more selfish ones. 
They find no gender difference in altruistic behavior. Eckel et al. (2011) conduct a dictator 
game experiment with 490 high school students from ninth and eleventh grades (15 to 17 years 
old), and 91 university students. They find very high levels of giving for their high school 
students, but do not observe any differences between genders. 
 4 
Harbaugh et al. (2003) report an experiment with 310 children and teenagers aged seven 
to 18 years, showing that young children offer considerably less to recipients in the dictator 
game and the ultimatum game than older children and adults. Hence, the degree of selfishness, 
on average, decreases with age. Harbaugh et al. (2003) also show that boys make smaller 
dictator offers than girls, meaning that boys are, on average, more selfish. 
Almås et al. (2010) run experiments with 486 children from ten to 18 years. They let 
them play modified dictator games and find that children’s fairness norms evolve from favoring 
equality to favoring equity when they grow older. They observe significantly stronger 
efficiency concerns in adolescents than in younger children and find that male adolescents are 
more strongly oriented towards efficiency than female adolescents. 
Finally, Martinsson et al. (2011) use dictator games taken from Charness and Rabin 
(2002) and compare the behavior of 650 Austrian and Swedish children, aged ten to 15 years. 
They find a general trend towards an increasing importance of social-welfare preferences with 
age, with only small differences across countries. 
In sum, the clear majority of the mentioned studies suggest that in the course of growing 
up children become less selfish and more pro-social in allocation choices. While this general 
pattern mirrors findings in related psychological studies (see Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989; 
Gummerum et al., 2010), social preferences have a richer domain than just being more or less 
selfish, respectively more or less generous, in two-person allocation tasks. For this reason, we 
estimate the distribution of five different (outcome-based) motivations in terms of social 
preferences (selfishness, efficiency, maximin, inequality aversion à la Fehr and Schmidt, and 
inequality aversion à la Bolton and Ockenfels) across different age groups as well as separately 
for boys and girls. A notable distinction from the previous literature is that we use allocation 
tasks that involve three, rather than two, persons. With two-person tasks, the allocator is either 
better or worse off than the other person (if the allocation is unequal). With three-person tasks, 
it becomes possible that the allocator is better off than one other person in the group, but worse 
off than another one. Such situations give rise to weighing advantageous and disadvantageous 
inequality, and they also allow for estimating the importance of maximin-preferences 
separately. The importance of the latter justifies our approach ex post. Moreover, similar to the 
route taken in Almås et al. (2010) our paper contributes to the literature on social preferences 
in childhood and adolescence by presenting an econometric mixture model that allows us to 
estimate the influence of age and gender on the likelihood of revealing  a particular motivation. 
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We think that this makes the analysis of social preference motivations more informative than a 
mere description of choice frequencies, and it avoids the – in our view, unrealistic – assumption 
that a particular person is of a particular type with certainty and under all circumstances. Most 
importantly, however, our paper differs from all previously discussed papers in that it estimates 
both primary and secondary social preferences, thereby giving a more complete picture of how 
social preferences may motivate behavior, in particular when the primary motivation implies 
indifference between different choices. 
 
 
3. The experiment 
3.1. Theoretical background 
We define the five motives for decision making regarding social preferences as follows. Let yi 
and yj≠i be the material payoffs of a player i and a set of other players j≠i (where the set can be 
a singleton, but can also include more than one other player). A player i that maximizes yi 
regardless of yj≠i in an allocation decision is said to be selfish (and subsumed under the category 
Selfishness in the following). 
Social welfare considerations can take on various forms with two “extreme” special 
cases: if a subject maximizes the sum of payoffs (∑ 𝑦𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 ) she is classified as Efficiency-
oriented decision maker (following Utilitarian preferences), and if she maximizes the minimum 
payoff in her group of subjects she is denoted Maximin-motivated (following Rawlsian 
preferences). Both forms of social welfare considerations (Efficiency and Maximin) play an 
important role in the well-known behavioral model of Charness and Rabin (2002). 
Inequality aversion may also have a bearing on social welfare in that it may be 
informative about the relative importance between the two extreme points mentioned above. It 
could also be related to the selfish concerns where one evaluates one’s own income in relation 
to others’ income. This will become apparent as we discuss primary as well as secondary social 
preferences. Inequality aversion has been captured in two seminal models. While in Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) inequality is measured as the difference of one’s own payoff to each of the 
other players’ individual payoffs, and subjects have a disutility both from advantageous and 
disadvantageous inequality, in the ERC-model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) inequality is 
measured with respect to a subject’s share of the total payoff in her group. 
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More precisely, the utility function of player i  in the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is 
specified as  
𝑈𝑖(𝑦) = 𝑦𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖
1
𝑛−1
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑦𝑗 − 𝑦𝑖, 0}𝑗≠𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖
1
𝑛−1
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗 , 0}𝑗≠𝑖  (1) 
where n is the number of players, and it is assumed that the inequality sensitivity 
parameters satisfy two assumptions: (i) 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖, and (ii) 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 < 1. Preferences according to 
equation (1), given that 𝛽𝑖, 𝛼𝑖 > 0, will be called the F&S motivation in our data analysis. 
In the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) player i maximizes her motivation 
function, which is given by 
 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝜎𝑖), (2) 
where 𝑦𝑖denotes the player i ’s own payoff and 𝜎𝑖 her share of the total payoff in her 
group. For any given 𝑦𝑖 the value of the motivation function is maximized if 𝜎𝑖 = 1/𝑛. Acting 
according to (2) will be classified as ERC motivated in the following. 
 
3.2. Experimental design 
In their seminal paper, Engelmann and Strobel (2004) have designed simple distribution games 
to explicitly test and discriminate between the above-mentioned motivations of social 
preferences. We, therefore, rely on several aspects of their experimental design in our study.2 
In our experiment, each subject had to choose one out of three allocations in eight 
different games3 that were originally designed by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) with the aim 
to discriminate between the different social preference motivations of Selfishness, Efficiency, 
Maximin, and inequality aversion of the F&S- or ERC-variant. Each allocation assigns each of 
three persons (labeled persons 1 to 3) a specific amount of money (see Tables 1 to 3). Decisions 
were always made in the role of person 2 who had to choose an allocation that distributed money 
to persons 1, 2, and 3. Only at the end of the experiment the roles of persons 1, 2, and 3 as well 
as payoff-relevant decisions were finally determined for each participant. Subjects were 
                                                 
2 Note that Engelmann and Strobel’s (2004) results have initiated a discussion on the influence of different subject 
pools (such as economics versus non-economics students, or subjects not pursuing a college/university 
education) on results regarding the distribution of social preference types. See the comments by Fehr, et al. 
(2006) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2006) on Engelmann and Strobel (2004) and the reply by Engelmann and 
Strobel (2006) for details. No reference was made in this discussion to the development of social preferences of 
children and adolescents. 
3 Following the literature we call the experimental task of choosing one out of three allocations a “game”, although 
there is no strategic interaction. Strictly speaking, the task is an individual decision making task on the allocation 
of monetary payoffs. We also follow the terminology of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) when presenting the 
three subsets of games in Subsections 3.2.1 to 3.2.3. 
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randomly assigned to groups of three people and the distribution chosen by person 2 was 
implemented.4 The eight games can be grouped into three different sets of games that are 
introduced in the following. 
 
3.2.1. Taxation games 
In this set of games, the income of the decision maker (person 2) is the same in all three 
allocations and person 2 is always the “middle income” earner, while person 1 (person 3) is 
always the “high income” (“low income”) earner. The decision maker has to decide on a 
distribution between high and low income, which resembles a redistributive tax system. We 
selected two out of the four taxation games used in Engelmann and Strobel (2004). The payoffs 
of the two games are presented in Table 1 (games Fx and Ex in Engelmann and Strobel, 2004).5 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Obviously, one cannot identify a selfish motivation with taxation games, since the 
payoff for person 2 is the same in all three allocations. In both games, Maximin and F&S predict 
the same choice, while ERC predicts a different allocation choice than F&S. The efficient 
allocation (Efficiency) coincides in game Fx with F&S and Maximin and in game Ex with ERC. 
As a consequence, it is possible to distinguish the importance of the two inequality aversion 
models, ERC and F&S, without any confounding effects arising from efficiency concerns. 
 
3.2.2. Envy games 
In the three envy games presented in Table 2 (games N, Nx, and Ny in Engelmann and Strobel, 
2004), the decision maker (i.e., person 2) is again the “middle income” earner. These games 
aim at eliciting preferences concerning inequality. Envy could make person 2 reduce income of 
the high-income individual, although it would also reduce it for the low-income person. In game 
N the payoff of person 2 is fixed, and the F&S-choice is Pareto-dominated by the ERC-
                                                 
4 Note that Engelmann and Strobel (2004) also used decisions under role uncertainty in their main experiment, but 
report that determining roles right from the beginning in a control experiment (meaning that only participants in 
the role of person 2 had to make decisions) does not yield different results regarding the distribution of social 
preferences. 
5 For explanations regarding the predictions summarized in Table 1, see Engelmann and Strobel (2004). We have 
included in Tables 1 to 3 already the relative frequencies of actually chosen distributions. We shall refer to these 
results in Section 4. 
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compliant allocation, whereas the ERC-choice is also Pareto-dominated by the 
efficient/maximin choices. Games Nx and Ny are necessary to distinguish between selfishness 
and the non-selfish motives. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
3.2.3. Rich and Poor games 
Table 3 presents the third set of games. While the decision maker’s payoff is held constant in 
each game, the relation to the other two players’ payoffs varies. In game R (P) the decision 
maker is the richest (poorest) group member in any allocation, while in game Ey the decision 
maker is the “middle income” earner. In the “Rich and Poor” games, F&S and ERC predict the 
same choice of allocation. Consequently, these games are used to distinguish between 
efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and inequality concerns. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
3.3. Experimental procedure 
The experiment was run in three elementary schools and four high schools in the Federal State 
of Tyrol, Austria. It was part of a larger series of experiments in which we visited the involved 
schools repeatedly over a period of two years, asking children to make decisions in different 
experimental tasks (for example, to study their risk and time preferences; see Sutter et al., 2013). 
There is an overlap in the subject pools used in Martinsson et al. (2011) and Fehr et al. (2013) 
and our paper. Out of the 883 subjects participating in the experiment of this paper, 705 had 
participated in Fehr et al. (2013) and 482 in Martinsson et al. (2011). In section 2 we have 
presented the main research questions and results of these papers, and how we differ from them. 
 The whole project was approved by the State Board of Education of Tyrol and the 
principals of the selected schools. All parents of involved children were sent a letter with 
general information on the project and its aim to study economic decision making (including 
the information that children could earn money in the experiments), without revealing any 
specific details or experimental tasks to be completed. Parents were of course free not to 
approve participation of their children, but only five out of almost 900 did so. All other parents 
gave their consent. 
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Children and teenagers were also instructed clearly that participation was voluntary (and 
that they could earn money), but no single child refused to participate in any of the experiments 
that we conducted. Since the experiment was run during regular school hours, and given that 
all students in the selected classes participated, there is practically no self-selection into the 
experiment. The participants were between eight and 17 years old. They were attending third, 
fifth, seventh, ninth, or eleventh grade in school. Table 4 presents the number of participants, 
split up by age and gender.6 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The experiment was conducted as a pen-and-paper experiment in all 38 classes in which 
we conducted the experiment. Each single session was run jointly by the first (male) and third 
(female) authors of this paper, thus keeping conditions identical across sessions. The following 
procedure was used in all sessions: first, the instructions were explained, following a fixed script 
which is included in Appendix A1 in the Online Supplement.7 Already in the course of 
explaining the experiment, subjects were given plenty of opportunities to ask private questions. 
It is important to stress that our explanations were visually supported by drawing “decision 
trees” on the blackboard in order to illustrate the choices to be taken and how role selection (as 
persons 1, 2, or 3) would take place. Furthermore, we went through many examples. 
After the general explanation of the experimental task we asked subjects to answer two 
control questions that concerned the indication of payoffs contingent on particular choices and 
role assignments.8 The sheet with the control questions was collected before we explained once 
more in public the correct solutions. Collecting these sheets allows us to check whether those 
subjects who made mistakes in the control questions make different choices in the experiment 
than those answering correctly. Overall, we had 679 out of 883 subjects who answered both 
questions correctly (accounting for 77% of the sample). The right-hand side of Table 4 shows 
                                                 
6 Note that one of the high schools involved is attended by girls only. Therefore, we have more girls than boys in 
our sample. There is no indication, however, that girls in the single-sex school exhibit a different behavior in 
our experiment than those in schools with co-education. 
7 Note that the translation of the fixed script does not account for the fact that, contingent on private questions that 
were taken by the experimenters, some parts of the instructions were repeated if necessary. 
8 The control questions were open questions. Consequently, nine possible answers could be given per control 
question (i.e. the nine different payoffs). Thus, getting both control questions right per mere guessing was very 
unlikely. 
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the number of subjects with correct answers in each age group, indicating that the relative 
frequency of correct answers is increasing sharply with age. Since we explained the correct 
solutions after collecting the control questions, but before the experiment, and also answered 
any remaining questions on the control questions in detail, we are confident that participants 
understood the experimental task very well. For the analysis, we therefore present in the main 
text the results based on all 883 participants. In Appendix A3 in the Online Supplement, we 
provide a sensitivity analysis of our main results that excludes all participants with at least one 
incorrect answer in the control questions; hence, the results of this analysis are based on the 
679 subjects with correct answers only. As it turns out, there are only minor differences between 
the two pools. In particular, taking the restricted sample renders selfish behavior less important 
(and sometimes insignificant), while the significance of all other social preferences remains 
practically unchanged.9 
After the control questions had been worked through and no more questions remained 
unanswered, students were given their decision sheets and asked to make their eight choices. 
They could go back and forth and change their answers if they wished.  
Students were informed at the beginning of the experiment that they would never be 
matched with someone from their own class, but with someone from the same grade in any of 
the schools participating in the experiment. The matching was determined after the experiment 
by randomly grouping persons 1, 2, and 3 from the same grade together, excluding class mates 
as potential matches. At the end of the experiment, each student answered a short questionnaire 
on demographic background data and then drew a card that determined her role (as person 1, 2, 
or 3) and then rolled an eight-sided dice to determine which decision was payoff-relevant.10 
                                                 
9 Also when looking at the ranks of the five different motives, we notice a strong coincidence of the results in 
Table 5 and those presented in Appendix A3. Out of the ten panels (with age x gender), five show the exact 
same ranking, and in the other five there are two (out of the five) motivations that swap ranks, meaning that in 
total of the 50 ranks in Table 5 (5 per panel), 40 ranks are identical in Appendix A3, and the ten others are 
mutual swaps. 
10 We prepared for each age group the number of cards needed for all subjects to have full triples of person 1, 
person 2 and person 3. Hence, in each age group we had at most one triple that was incomplete. In the latter 
case, we used another person’s decision a second time to substitute for the missing person in the triple, but 
everybody was of course paid based on exactly one decision of a person 2. Since it was independently determined 
for each subject which game was payoff-relevant, it may have been the case that someone made a decision 
relevant for themselves, but not for anyone else in a particular game (or vice versa). However, this fact should 
not matter for the decisions, since the payoff was determined by the assigned person 2 in the particular game 
that was chosen by the dice roll. 
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Monetary earnings were distributed in sealed envelopes marked with a student’s ID within two 
weeks after the experiment.11 
In order to provide roughly the same relative monetary incentives to all participants we 
varied the stake sizes with age. Hence, the real payoffs were smaller in our game than in 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004), where subjects were university students.12 The amounts 
presented in Tables 1 to 3 are in euros and euro-cents, and they applied for students aged 14 to 
17 (grades nine and eleven). For the younger age groups (grades three, five, and seven) these 
amounts were divided by two to account for their significantly lower pocket money and 
purchasing power.13 It should be noted that the school curriculum for third-graders in Austria 
includes a detailed treatment of money and how euros and euro-cents relate to each other and 
how money-amounts can be added or subtracted from each other. The lessons including this 
information had been prior to our experiment in the third grade, meaning that third-graders (and 
certainly all students in higher grades) were familiar with how to read the payoffs on our 
decision sheets and understood the examples that we used. 
Finally, we would like to mention that we presented the games in a way that is slightly 
different from Engelmann and Strobel (2004). They had shown for each possible allocation the 
average payoff per person and the total sum of payoffs. The concept of an average is unfamiliar 
to the youngest children in our sample, and hence we did not mention it. Furthermore, we did 
not indicate the total sum of payoffs because we were afraid that this could provide a too strong 
focal point for the students’ choices. As a consequence, we could keep the decision sheet as 
simple as possible. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Since we were running several experiments with the children over the course of two years, children were sure 
(and had experienced it before) that we would come back and pay them the correct earnings according to the 
rules in the experiment. 
12 Given that the experiments by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) were incentivized using D-Mark, it implies that 
we multiplied real payoffs by 0.4 (0.8) for our younger (older) participants. 
13 According to the survey that we conducted with the same set of children, the average pocket money for 5 th-
graders is around € 5 per week, while it is about € 14 for 9th-graders. Age groups were provided with age-specific 
decision sheets with their payoffs in € stated accordingly. 
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4. Results 
4.1. Overview of choices 
The bottom panels of Tables 1 to 3 present an overview of the relative choice frequencies in the 
three different sets of games. We show overall averages (“Total sample”), average results for 
girls and boys separately, and also average results for each age group. In order to facilitate 
comparison of our results to choices made by adults we also include the relative choice 
frequencies from Engelmann and Strobel (2004) in the last line of each table. It is immediately 
obvious that our oldest participants (16- to 17-year olds) make decisions that are in most games 
similar to those in Engelmann and Strobel (2004). One marked exception is the game Ny where 
we observe a much larger frequency of selfish/inequality-motivated choices and a lower 
frequency of efficiency/maximin-motivated choices than Engelmann and Strobel (2004). 
The general pattern in our data is that we find significant differences between the 
choices of girls and boys in all games except “game N” and “game Nx” of the “Envy games”. 
We also observe significant age differences in the choice frequencies in all games (least 
pronounced in “game P” of the “Rich and Poor games”). In order to examine the influence of 
age and gender in greater detail and in a more rigorous way, we proceed in the following with 
an econometric analysis of the data. 
 
4.2. Econometric analysis of social preferences 
We conduct a maximum likelihood error-rate analysis of subjects’ decisions following the 
general lines of the econometric model used in Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). The econometric 
model is a mixture model in which each subject’s primary motivation is drawn from a common 
prior distribution over the five types of motivations Selfishness, Efficiency, Maximin, F&S, and 
ERC. A subject’s motivation is assumed to be the same in all eight games, but decision makers 
are allowed to make errors. 
More formally, let 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑁} index the subjects and let 𝑘 ∈ {1, . . . , 5} denote the 
different motivations of social preferences a subject can exhibit. Define 𝑐 ∈ {1, 2, 3} as the 
number of choices that are compatible with a given motivation k in a given game.14 We assume 
that a k-motivated subject normally makes a k-compatible decision, but in each game the subject 
makes an error with probability 𝜀𝑘  ∈  [0,1]. If a subject makes an error, she chooses each of 
                                                 
14 Recall that in some games the prediction for a specific motivation allows for more than one choice option. 
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the three available actions with probability 1/3. For a given k-motivated subject, the probability 
of a k-compatible decision in a given game is then 
1
𝑐
−
3−𝑐
3 𝑐
𝜀𝑘. Accordingly, the probability of 
any single non k-compatible decision is 
 𝜀𝑘
3
. We assume that the errors are i.i.d. across games 
and subjects.15 
The likelihood function is constructed as follows: let 𝑇𝑘,𝑐 denote the total number of 
games in which there are c k-compatible decisions. Furthermore, 𝑥𝑘
𝑖𝑐 represents the number of 
subject i’s decisions that are compatible with k’s behavior in games in which she has c k-
motivated decisions, with 𝑥𝑘
𝑖 = (𝑥𝑘
𝑖1, 𝑥𝑘
𝑖2, 𝑥𝑘
𝑖3), 𝑥𝑖 = (𝑥1
𝑖 , … , 𝑥5
𝑖 ), and  𝑥 = (𝑥1, … . , 𝑥𝑁). Let 𝑝𝑘 
denote a subject’s common prior probability of being k-motivated, with ∑ 𝑝𝑘
5
𝑘=1 = 1  and 𝑝 =
(𝑝1, … , 𝑝5), while 𝜀𝑘 indicates the error rate of a k-motivated subject and  𝜀 = (𝜀1, … . , 𝜀5). The 
probability of observing a particular sample with 𝑥𝑘
𝑖  k compatible decisions when subject i is k-
motivated can then be expressed as:  
𝐿𝑘
𝑖 (𝜀𝑘|𝑥𝑘
𝑖 ) = ∏ [
1
𝑐
−
3−𝑐
3 𝑐
𝜀𝑘]
𝑥𝑘
𝑖𝑐
[
 𝜀𝑘
3
]
𝑇𝑘,𝑐−𝑥𝑘
𝑖𝑐
𝑐=1,2,3 ,                                                        (3) 
If one weighs the right-hand side by 𝑝𝑘, takes the sum over k, applies logarithms, and 
then sums over i, one gets the log-likelihood function for the entire sample: 
ln 𝐿(𝑝, 𝜀|𝑥) = ∑ ln ∑ 𝑝𝑘𝐿𝑘
𝑖 (𝜀𝑘|𝑥𝑘
𝑖 )5𝑘=1
𝑁
𝑖=1  (4) 
With five motivations the model has nine independent parameters: four independent motivation 
probabilities 𝑝𝑘, and five motivation error rates 𝜀𝑘. We produce ten separate estimations for this 
set of parameters maximizing function (4), separately for each age group and gender.16 
 
4.2.1. Primary social preference motivations0 
The estimated parameters 𝑝 = (𝑝1, … , 𝑝5) represent the distribution of social preference 
motivations and are given in Table 5 as well as presented graphically in Figures 1 and 2.17 A 
                                                 
15 Engelmann and Strobel (2004) use a logit model in their estimation while we use a uniform distribution of the 
error term. Note that in the design of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) each subject faces only one decision, for 
which reason they cannot take into account any individual differences but have to focus on the “average subject” 
with all heterogeneity incorporated in the error. In our design each subject faces eight decisions, allowing us to 
take into account individual differences and to estimate the distribution of types directly (while the approach of 
Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, yields harder-to-interpret odds ratios).  
16 We use an EM algorithm as proposed in the seminal paper of Dempster et al. (1977). Standard errors are 
estimated by bootstrap. 
17 All the results presented here are robust to an alternative error structure reported in Appendix A4. In this 
alternative model, for a given motivation the non compatible decisions have different probabilities to be chosen.  
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general pattern emerging from Table 5 is that Efficiency and Maximin explain the largest 
fraction of subjects’ primary motivations indicating that social welfare as compared to selfish 
motives plays a major role. However, there are interesting effects of age and gender when 
considering single social preferences. From Figure 1 as well as Table 5 it becomes obvious that 
girls are primarily Maximin-motivated and that this motivation increases with age. In total, 
roughly 50% of the girls have Maximin as their primary motivation. Among boys, Figure 2 and 
Table 5 show that Efficiency is instead the most common social preference motive (in slightly 
more than 40% of boys, with an almost monotonic increase with age). Efficiency is also the 
second most common motivation among girls, but without the clear age profile as for boys. 
Among boys, more than 20 % are primarily motivated by Selfishness and Maximin, 
respectively, while a much smaller share of girls display selfish preferences (12%). F&S-
preferences are about as common among girls as Selfishness, and even less among boys. 
Moreover, these preferences become less prominent with age. More precisely, the estimated 
probability of F&S-preferences becomes even insignificant in the two oldest age groups (14/15 
years and 16/17 years). ERC-preferences are not significant in any age group (borderline for 
boys of age eight to eleven), corroborating the conclusion of Engelmann and Strobel (2004) 
that ERC is not as suitable in explaining behavior as F&S.  
 
Table 5 and Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
To evaluate how well our model can explain the data, we counted how many 
observations correspond precisely to the behavior of the primary motivation subjects are 
assigned to. Using the estimated parameters, by equation (3) we calculated for each subject the 
probability to obtain the observed data, assuming that the individual has a given k-motivation, 
i.e. 𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝑘𝑖), where – with a slight abuse of notation – 𝑥𝑖 denotes the choices and 𝑘𝑖  =  1, … 5 
denotes the primary motivation of individual i. Finally, using Bayes rule we can compute the 
probability that an individual i is k-motivated, given the observed choices, i.e., 𝑝(𝑘𝑖|𝑥𝑖). For 
example, the probability that individual i is motivated by Selfishness- (𝑘𝑖 = 1), given the 
observed choices 𝑥𝑖, is: 
𝑝(𝑘𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) =
𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝑘𝑖 = 1)𝑝1
𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝑘𝑖 = 1)𝑝1+𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝑘𝑖 = 2)𝑝2+𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝑘𝑖 = 3)𝑝3+𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝑘𝑖 = 4)𝑝4+𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝑘𝑖 = 5)𝑝5
     (5) 
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Then we assign each individual to the primary motivation that gives us the highest posterior 
probability and use the assigned motivation for each individual to check if the observed 
behavior of the individual coincides with the predicted behavior. This way, we calculate the 
proportion of observations where subjects behave exactly in accordance with the primary 
motivation they were assigned to (Table 6). Across all age groups and both genders, this fraction 
ranges from 72.1% to 83.7%, thus indicating a large share of correctly predicted choices.18 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
4.2.2. Secondary social preference motivations 
Our approach also allows checking the posterior distribution of a subject’s most probable 
secondary motivation19, conditional on his or her primary motivation. This is important to look 
at because if a subject’s primary motivation implies indifference between various choices (e.g., 
a selfish person is indifferent between choices in the taxation and rich-and-poor games), then 
the secondary motivation will become crucial for making the choice. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
Table 7 presents the posterior distribution of the secondary motivations, conditional on 
primary motivations. In the rows we present, conditional on each of the primary motivations 
(whose posterior relative frequency is shown in Table A1 in the Online Supplement), the 
relative frequency with which any of the four remaining motivations is the most likely 
secondary motivation. We observe differences between girls and boys also here.  
A majority of the girls have Maximin as their primary motivation, and among these, the 
secondary motivation is most likely Efficiency, followed by F&S. Among the 24% girls who 
are primarily Efficiency-motivated more than two thirds display Maximin as their secondary 
motivation, further corroborating that this motive plays a great role for girls’ decision making. 
                                                 
18 The predictions of the model are equally good for all groups, meaning that its fit does not depend on age and 
gender. 
19 We assign each individual to the motivation that gives us the second highest posterior probability computed 
using the procedure described above. 
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Among the boys, the most common  primary motivation is Efficiency, and the secondary 
motivations conditional on having Efficiency as the primary are about equally divided over 
Selfishness and Maximin. The boys whose primary motivation is instead Selfishness (Maximin) 
hold secondary motivations that are to the largest extent Efficiency, followed by Maximin 
(Efficiency and Selfishness are of roughly equal importance). Hence, Table 7 corroborates our 
finding that girls and boys differ clearly in their social preferences, also when taking secondary 
motivations into account. 
 
4.2.3. A robustness check for primary social preference motivations 
As a final robustness check of our results we assess the impact of age and gender on a subject’s 
probability of having a specific primary motivation in another way: we assume that parameters 
𝑝𝑘 have the following multinomial logit specification: 
𝑝𝑘 =
𝑒𝛼𝑘,0+𝛼𝑘,1∙𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟+𝛼𝑘,2∙𝑎𝑔𝑒+𝛼𝑘,3∙𝑔𝑒𝑛_𝑎𝑔𝑒
1+∑ 𝑒𝛼ℎ,0+𝛼ℎ,1∙𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟+𝛼ℎ,2∙𝑎𝑔𝑒+𝛼ℎ,3∙𝑔𝑒𝑛_𝑎𝑔𝑒4ℎ=1
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑘 ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}                     (6)   
𝑝5 =
1
1+∑ 𝑒𝛼ℎ,0+𝛼ℎ,1∙𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟+𝛼ℎ,2∙𝑎𝑔𝑒+𝛼ℎ,3∙𝑔𝑒𝑛_𝑎𝑔𝑒4ℎ=1
       (7) 
where “gen_age” is the interaction variable between gender and age20. Specifications (6) 
and (7) are plugged into (4). Then we produce a one-step estimation, maximizing function (4), 
over the whole dataset.  
By this specification the model has 21 parameters that we can use to estimate the marginal 
effect of age and gender on the prior probabilities of being k-motivated. Table 8 presents the 
results of this analysis. 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
Not many subjects hold Selfishness as their primary motivation. Although there are 
some differences (see Table A1) they are not statistically significant with respect to age and 
gender. The probability of holding Efficiency as the primary motivation is increasing with age 
for boys, but constant for girls. More precisely, the probability of having Efficiency as the 
                                                 
20 In this estimation, we use the exact age (in years and months) of the subjects at the time of the experimental 
sessions. This allows for a finer-grained estimation of the age affect. 
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primary motivation is the same for boys and girls in the youngest age group of eight- to nine-
year olds, but it is significantly higher for boys in all other age groups. Maximin-preferences 
become more prominent with increasing age for girls, but their prominence remains constant 
across all age groups for boys, and it is significantly lower for boys than for girls in all age 
groups. 
The likelihood of exhibiting F&S-preferences is decreasing with age for boys while it 
is constant for girls. There are no significant gender differences with respect to F&S-preferences 
in the two youngest age groups, up to the age of eleven years. In the three oldest age groups, 
girls exhibit significantly higher values, i.e., they care more about inequality than boys.  
The overall picture emerging from Table 8 can be summarized as follows: efficiency-
concerns become much more important, while inequality aversion becomes less important for 
boys as they grow older. The desire to maximize the payoff of the worst-off group member 
becomes more important when girls get older. 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
We have studied the influence of age and gender on the distribution of individual social 
preferences. In our experiment, subjects had to make eight different, fully incentivized 
allocation choices that were originally designed by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) to 
distinguish between five different social preference motivations: selfishness, efficiency 
concerns (by maximizing the sum of payoffs), maximin preferences (by maximizing the payoff 
of the worst off), and two forms of inequality aversion (based on the models by Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999, and Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). We have run our experiments with almost 
900 eight- to 17-year old children and adolescents. The experiments were conducted in school 
(from third to eleventh grade), with practically no drop-outs, thus avoiding potential problems 
that might arise from self-selection into experiments. A comparison of the behavior of our 
oldest subjects with the choices of the subjects in Engelmann and Strobel (2004) reveals that 
the decisions of both subject pools (i.e., our oldest high school students and the university 
students in Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) are largely in line with each other, except for one 
instance where their subjects lay an even stronger focus on efficiency/maximin-concerns. 
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Our experimental results show that inequality aversion turns out to be a significant 
motivation in our younger age groups of eight- to twelve-year olds. For the older age groups, 
however, we note that inequality aversion is no longer a significant motivation. Our findings 
on inequality aversion are in line with Fehr et al. (2013) and Martinsson et al. (2011), and they 
complement in an interesting way the results of Fehr et al. (2008). The latter have found that 
inequality aversion develops and becomes the most prominent motivation for allocation choices 
when children are seven to eight years old, compared to younger children of age three to six. 
Our findings show that inequality aversion as a motivating force may, indeed, reach a peak 
before the age of ten years and then decline in importance, especially for boys, making room 
for other concerns, especially efficiency-orientation. Note that a majority of children was found 
to be inequality averse in Fehr et al. (2008), while only about 20% of our youngest participants 
were classified as inequality averse. One potential source for this difference stems from the fact 
that Fehr et al. (2008) did not use money as a reward, while we did. Unpublished work by Fehr 
et al. (2017) suggests that using money – instead of goods such as fruits or stickers – in 
experiments with children reduces the fraction of inequality averse children. 
We find that efficiency concerns are significantly increasing with age in our male 
sample (with the primary motivation ranging from about 30% at the age of eight to roughly 
50% at the age of 17). For girls, the evidence is a bit more mixed, as the estimated shares go up 
and down over the different age groups, but in almost all age groups (except the youngest ones) 
girls are significantly less efficiency-oriented than boys. The relative increase of efficiency 
concerns for boys is consistent with the findings reported in Almås et al. (2010), who have also 
found that boys care more about efficiency than girls. Moreover, a significant increase of 
efficiency concerns in the age group of nine- to 17-year olds and a stronger male focus on 
efficiency has also been documented in the paper by Fehr et al. (2013). In the study of Almås 
et al. (2010), girls also care relatively more about equality. Note that the two-person design of 
Almås et al. (2010) does not allow disentangling equality motives from maximin-preferences 
properly. Hence, their finding and ours, that girls are primarily maximin-motivated and thereby 
very equity concerned, could be fully consistent with each other, although we do not find very 
strong support for the two inequality measures when contrasted with the maximin motivation. 
A novel feature of our experiment, compared to previous papers, was the estimation of 
both primary and secondary social preference motivations. As we have argued above, the most 
likely social preference motivation may imply indifference between various choices in some 
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situations, which means that then the second most important motivation will become crucial for 
making the choice. Moreover, estimating both the primary and the secondary motivation gives 
a more nuanced picture of the complex interplay of social preferences.  
Our main findings regarding secondary motivations are re-assuring for our results on 
primary motivations. Among the girls whose primary motivation is maximin, the secondary 
motivation is likely either efficiency or F&S. This indicates a strong preference for social 
welfare as compared to selfish motives, which scores low on both primary and secondary 
motivations among girls. The girls whose primary motivation is instead efficiency hold 
secondary motivations that are to more than two thirds maximin-motivated. 
Among the boys whose primary motivation is efficiency, the secondary motivations are 
about equally divided between selfishness and maximin. The boys whose primary motivation 
is instead selfishness (maximin) hold secondary motivations that are to the largest extent 
efficiency-motivated followed by maximin (efficiency and selfishness are roughly equally 
important). Hence, although a non-negligible fraction of the boys displays maximin preferences 
as either primary or secondary motivation, the general picture is that girls are strongly equality-
concerned, with maximin preferences as the strongest motive, while boys are more self- and 
efficiency-oriented and less concerned with equity.  
Summing up, our experiment indicates that there are significant developments in 
revealed social preferences from eight-year old children to 17-year old adolescents and that 
there are also relevant gender differences.21 The insights from our experiment can be considered 
of broader interest for several reasons: it seems plausible that social preferences shape many 
economically relevant decisions of teenagers, for instance in the domains of education, 
employment or charitable giving. Furthermore, economists might care about the development 
of social preferences in childhood and adolescence because the results of economic experiments 
might prove helpful in designing (economics and ethics) curricula in schools. For instance, 
experimental results could provide guidance on how to make children aware of different sharing 
norms and how to deal with conflicting norms. Future experiments could look at further motives 
or elaborate in even greater depth on the ones investigated here. It would also be interesting to 
see our results confirmed in an experiment that uses another set of decision tasks. 
                                                 
21 For an excellent overview of gender differences in preferences of adults in a variety of games see Croson and 
Gneezy (2009). 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Taxation games (payoffs in euro) 
 Game Fx Game Ex 
 Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Person 1 payoff 6.8 7.2 7.6 8.4 6.8 5.2 
Person 2 payoff 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Person 3 payoff 3.6 2 0.4 1.2 1.6 2.0 
Total payoff 14.4 13.2 12.0 14.4 13.2 12.0 
Prediction       
Selfish  Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Efficiency  Left   Left   
Maximin  Left     Right 
F&S  Left     Right 
ERC    Right Left   
Choices, percentages       
Total sample (N = 883) 65.8 19.9 14.3 34.2 10.8 55.0 
Boys (N = 269) 58.4 20.8 20.8 46.7 11.2 42.1 
Girls (N = 514) 71.2 19.3 9.6 25.2 10.6 64.2 
8/9 years old (N = 116) 53.5 18.1 28.5 40.4 17.5 42.1 
10/11 years old (N = 239) 54.8 25.5 19.7 35.4 10.1 54.4 
12/13 years old (N = 210) 68.6 21.4 10.0 28.2 9.1 62.7 
14/15 years old (N = 169) 69.8 19.5 10.7 38.7 7.7 53.6 
16/17 years old (N = 149) 84.6 10.7 4.7 30.9 12.8 56.4 
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) 86.7 6.7 6.7 40.0 16.7 43.3 
Chi2-tests for differences*       
Gender differences   0.001 0.001 
Age differences 0.001 0.019 
Age differences for boys 0.001 0.096 
Age differences for girls 0.001 0.030 
* p-values 
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Table 2: Envy games (payoffs in euro) 
 Game N Game Nx Game Ny 
 Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Person 1 payoff 6.4 5.2 4.0 6.4 5.2 4.0 4.0 5.2 6.4 
Person 2 payoff 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 3.6 3.2 2.8 
Person 3 payoff 2.0 1.2 0.4 2.0 1.2 0.4 0.4 1.2 2.0 
Total payoff 11.6 9.6 7.6 12.0 9.6 7.2 8.0 9.6 11.2 
Prediction        
Selfish  Left Middle Right Left   Left   
Efficiency Left   Left     Right 
Maximin Left   Left     Right 
F&S   Right Left  Right Left   
ERC  Middle  Left Middle  Left Middle  
Choices, percentage          
Total sample (N = 883) 67.2 12.5 20.3 87.9 7.9 4.2 42.7 18.0 39.2 
Boys (N = 269) 69.4 11.7 19.0 88.1 7.6 4.3 43.8 14.3 41.9 
Girls (N = 514) 65.7 13.1 21.3 87.8 8.0 4.1 42.0 20.7 37.3 
8/9 years old (N = 116) 47.0 17.4 35.7 74.8 13.9 11.3 41.4 17.2 41.4 
10/11 years old (N = 239) 66.1 13.0 20.9 84.8 9.3 5.9 42.0 10.1 47.9 
12/13 years old (N = 210) 69.5 9.5 21.0 92.9 3.3 3.8 45.7 14.3 40.0 
14/15 years old (N = 169) 73.4 13.6 13.0 87.6 11.2 1.2 34.3 25.4 40.2 
16/17 years old (N = 149) 74.5 10.7 14.8 96.6 3.4 0.0 50.3 28.2 21.5 
Engelmann/Strobel (2004) 70.0 26.7 3.3 83.3 13.3 3.3 10.0 13.3 76.7 
Chi2-tests for differences*          
Gender differences   0.516 0.960 0.046 
Age differences 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Age differences for boys 0.001 0.039 0.015 
Age differences for girls 0.123 0.001 0.001 
* p-values 
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Table 3: “Rich and Poor” games (payoffs in euro) 
 Game R Game P Game Ey 
 Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Person 1 payoff 2.0 3.2 4.4 3.2 4.4 5.6 5.2 6.8 8.4 
Person 2 payoff 4.8 4.8 4.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Person 3 payoff 1.6 1.2 0.8 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.2 
Total payoff 8.4 9.2 10.0 7.6 8.4 9.2 10.8 12.0 13.2 
Prediction    
Selfish Left Middle Right Left Middle Right Left Middle Right 
Efficiency   Right   Right   Right 
Maximin Left   Left Middle Right Left   
F&S    Right Left   Left   
ERC    Right Left   Left   
Choices, percentage          
Total sample (N = 883) 46.3 27.5 26.3 37.4 21.7 40.9 47.6 15.3 37.1 
Boys (N = 269) 38.5 28.7 32.8 31.4 20.8 47.8 40.4 11.7 48.0 
Girls (N = 514) 51.9 26.6 21.5 41.7 22.4 35.9 52.8 18.0 29.2 
8/9 years old (N = 116) 49.1 24.1 26.7 35.3 21.6 43.1 44.8 16.4 38.8 
10/11 years old (N = 239) 45.4 19.3 35.3 39.8 19.3 41.0 51.1 19.0 30.0 
12/13 years old (N = 210) 50.7 21.5 27.8 41.0 24.8 34.3 50.5 15.2 34.3 
14/15 years old (N = 169) 38.5 44.4 17.2 30.8 21.3 47.9 39.1 13.0 47.9 
16/17 years old (N = 149) 48.0 32.4 19.6 37.6 22.2 40.3 50.0 11.5 38.5 
Engelmann/Strobel (2004) 53.3 20.0 26.7 33.3 6.7 60.0 36.7 23.3 40.0 
Chi2-tests for differences*          
Gender differences   0.001 0.001 0.001 
Age differences 0.001 0.324 0.027 
Age differences for boys 0.013 0.316 0.236 
Age differences for girls 0.001 0.333 0.055 
* p-values 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Number of participants by age and gender 
  
All subjects 
 Subjects with correct answers in 
control questions 
 Girls Boys Total  Girls Boys Total % valid 
8/9 years (3rd grade) 56 60 116  31 33 64 55.2 % 
10/11 years (5th grade) 144 95 239  101 65 166 69.5 % 
12/13 years (7th grade) 122 88 210  96 74 170 81.0 % 
14/15 years (9th grade) 105 64 169  91 55 146 86.4 % 
16/17 years (11th grade) 86 63 149  77 56 133 89.3 % 
Total 513 370 883  396 283 679 76.9 % 
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Table 5: Estimated distribution of primary social preferences by gender and age (full sample, 
standard errors in parenthesis) 
  Girls Boys 
 Motivation 
Motivation 
probability 𝑝𝑘 
Error rate 𝜀𝑘 
Motivation 
probability 𝑝𝑘 
Error rate 𝜀𝑘 
Age group 8/9 Selfishness 0.122** 0.000*** 0.321*** 0.244*** 
  (0.061) (0.125) (0.116) (0.169) 
 Efficiency 0.197*** 0.328*** 0.303*** 0.333*** 
  (0.067) (0.087) (0.073) (0.070) 
 Maximin 0.501*** 0.630*** 0.054 0.090*** 
  (0.104) (0.076) (0.046) (0.253) 
 F&S 0.180** 0.422*** 0.163** 0.385** 
  (0.077) (0.100) (0.077) (0.263) 
 ERC 0.000 1.000 0.159* 1.000 
  (0.025) (0.095) (0.093) (0.040) 
 LogLikelihood -434.99 -457.01 
Age group 10/11 Selfishness 0.166*** 0.000*** 0.128*** 0.000*** 
  (0.046) (0.076) (0.049) (0.113) 
 Efficiency 0.345*** 0.479*** 0.362*** 0.356*** 
  (0.050) (0.037) (0.060) (0.054) 
 Maximin 0.297*** 0.227*** 0.275*** 0.365*** 
  (0.050) (0.041) (.065) (0.079) 
 F&S 0.146*** 0.324*** 0.150*** 0.407*** 
  (0.039) (0.042) (0.052) (0.079) 
 ERC 0.046 1.000 0.086* 0.791 
  (0.029) (0.068) (0.050) (0.231) 
 LogLikelihood -1023.00 -690.06 
Age group 12/13 Selfishness 0.140*** 0.203*** 0.223*** 0.000*** 
  (0.053) (0.111) (0.060) (0.026) 
 Efficiency 0.151*** 0.394*** 0.429*** 0.414*** 
  (0.046) (0.066) (0.072) (0.050) 
 Maximin 0.546*** 0.325*** 0.292*** 0.412*** 
  (0.060) (0.031) (0.079) (0.061) 
 F&S 0.163*** 0.336*** 0.055 0.213*** 
  (0.047) (0.045) (0.034) (0.157) 
 ERC 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
  (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
 LogLikelihood -830.69 -622.13 
Age group 14/15 Selfishness 0.052 0.000*** 0.277*** 0.456*** 
  (0.040) (0.216) (0.097) (0.191) 
 Efficiency 0.341*** 0.491*** 0.532*** 0.388*** 
  (0.068) (0.056) (0.092) (0.060) 
 Maximin 0.558*** 0.470*** 0.192*** 0.284*** 
  (0.079) (0.043) (0.074) (0.106) 
 F&S 0.048 0.343** 0.000 1.000 
  (0.038) (0.295) (0.017) (0.157) 
 ERC 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
  (0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.021) 
 LogLikelihood -777.06 -456.47 
Age group 16/17 Selfishness 0.106* 0.000*** 0.215*** 0.060*** 
  (0.059) (0.084) (0.078) (0.076) 
 Efficiency 0.121*** 0.347*** 0.507*** 0.334*** 
  (0.043) (0.065) (0.078) (0.030) 
 Maximin 0.694*** 0.437*** 0.278*** 0.301*** 
  (0.078) (0.034) (0.070) (0.034) 
 F&S 0.079 0.356*** 0.000 0.276*** 
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  (0.053) (0.061) (0.022) (0.224) 
 ERC 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.930* 
  (0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.040) 
 LogLikelihood -606.22 -411.00 
All age groups Selfishness 0.126*** 0.071*** 0.226*** 0.183*** 
  (0.026) (0.078) (0.039) (0.081) 
 Efficiency 0.249*** 0.458*** 0.433*** 0.379*** 
  (0.027) (0.03) (0.033) (0.025) 
 Maximin 0.483*** 0.387*** 0.223*** 0.341*** 
  (0.035) (0.022) (0.034) (0.040) 
 F&S 0.126*** 0.348*** 0.082*** 0.355*** 
  (0.021) (0.024) (0.022) (0.046) 
 ERC 0.015 1.000 0.036 1.000 
  (0.015) (0.12) (0.024) (0.097) 
 LogLikelihood -3705.18 -2663.64 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, for motivation probability the null hypothesis is 
𝑝𝑘 = 0, for error rate the null hypothesis is 𝜀𝑘 = 1  (i.e. random behavior) 
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Table 6: Fraction of actual choices predicted correctly 
by the most likely primary motivation of each subject (in %) 
 Girls Boys 
Age group 8/9 74.6 82.5 
Age group 10/11 81.8 79.5 
Age group 12/13 82.1 82.4 
Age group 14/15 72.1 80.5 
Age group 16/17 76.7 83.7 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Distribution of the second most likely social preference, conditional on the most likely 
primary motivation, by gender 
 
   Second most probable motivation 
   Selfishness Efficiency Maximin F&S ERC 
Girls Most probable motivation Selfishness - 30.9 34.6 30.9 3.6 
 (primary motivation) Efficiency 11.5 - 67.7 0.0 20.8 
  Maximin 21.8 43.2 - 34.7 0.4 
  F&S 27.8 1.9 63.0 - 7.4 
  ERC 0.0 33.3 33.3 33.3 - 
Boys Most probable motivation Selfishness - 37.0 25.9 12.3 24.7 
 (primary motivation) Efficiency 49.7 - 37.9 1.3 11.1 
  Maximin 41.7 38.5 - 13.5 6.3 
  F&S 53.6 0.0 28.6 - 17.9 
  ERC 16.7 50.0 16.7 16.7 - 
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Table 8: Marginal effect on the prior k-motivation probabilities 
Effect of / on Selfishness Efficiency Maximin F&S ERC 
Age 
for Male 
-0.010 0.026** 0.013 -0.022*** -0.007 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) 
for Female 
-0.010 -0.014 0.043*** -0.014 -0.005 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.007) 
Gender 
(female 
effect) 
for age group 8/9 
-0.019 -0.019 0.150** -0.018 -0.093 
(0.072) (0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.109) 
for age group 10/11 
-0.056 -0.143*** 0.179*** 0.030 -0.010 
(0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.040) (0.040) 
for age group 12/13 
-0.062 -0.238*** 0.235*** 0.064** 0.002 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.032) (0.016) 
for age group 14/15 
-0.058 -0.309*** 0.297*** 0.069** 0.001 
(0.052) (0.050) (0.055) (0.033) (0.005) 
for age group 16/17 
-0.052 -0.370*** 0.362*** 0.060* 0.000 
(0.067) (0.070) (0.078) (0.033) (0.001) 
Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, standard errors in parentheses. 
Marginal effects of age are computed evaluating the derivatives w.r.t age of (6) and (7) evaluated at the average 
age of male and female. Marginal effects of gender are computed taking the differences of (6) and (7) between 
female and male and evaluated at the average age of each age group. 
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Figure 1: Girls’ estimated distribution of primary social preferences (based on Table 5) 
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Figure 2: Boys’ estimated distribution of primary social preferences (based on Table 5) 
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